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Qualified Immunity: A Legal Fiction That Has Outlived Utility
S. RAFE FOREMAN*
First, permit me to thank the Ohio Northern University Claude W. Pettit
College of Law, Charles H. Rose III, Dean of the Claude W. Pettit College
of Law, and the Goldman Lecture Series. I am deeply honored to have been
asked to present the Goldman Lecture. Second, let me point out that this
document is not intended as a scholarly law review article or even a treatise
* S. Rafe Foreman is the 2021 recipient of the Lifetime Achievement Award presented each year at the
prestigious Educating Advocacy Teachers conference held at Stetson University School of Law. Rafe is
married for 34 years with two daughters that he adores. He is a partner in Hutchison & Foreman PLLC,
has been representing people who have been wrongfully accused, discriminated against and/or physically
and emotionally injured since 1988. He is a trial lawyer, consultant and professor and tries cases
involving criminal defense, plaintiff's: personal injury, civil rights, employment, discrimination,
wrongful death, excessive force and 1983 actions. Rafe is Board Certified by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization in the area of criminal law since 1994. He is licensed to practice law in Texas, Oklahoma,
New Mexico, and Missouri and has jury verdicts in each of these states and has litigated cases in
Louisiana, South Dakota, Colorado, California, Washington, Florida, and Arizona just to name a few.
Susan Hutchison, his law partner, and Rafe have obtained many record setting jury verdicts throughout
Texas and the country. Their most recent verdict was obtained in Dallas Federal Court in May of 2021
where they received a record verdict for their client, a 72-year-old man who was discriminated against
based on gender. They have had multiple cases pending before the United States Supreme Court. Rafe
has been voted as a Super Lawyer for many years in Texas. Rafe is both a retired and current law
professor. He has been on the Trial Lawyer’s College Faculty for 20 years and remains an adjunct
Professor of Law at Stetson Law. Rafe retried from UMKC Law and the Douglas Stripp Endowed Chair
in Advocacy after leading them to highest advocacy ranking in the school’s history. Rafe, along with
Professor Tobin created the only jury selection trial competition in the country known as the Show Me
Challenge. He holds an undergraduate degree from Texas A&M University and a law degree from
Texas Tech University School of Law. Rafe is passionate about rectifying discrimination and has a few
jury trials left in him yet. Parkinson’s may be his condition but it is not his story.
The following is an adaptation from the Goldman Lecture presented at the Ohio Northern University
Claude W. Pettit College of Law (April 6, 2022). Allison Morgan, Texas Tech University School of
Law student and law clerk for S. Rafe Foreman, edited this paper and contributed to this article
substantively.
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on the law of qualified immunity. Instead, it is a conglomeration of
information from various private and public sources and a working set of
papers with actual cases, many of my own, and facts to help illustrate and
perhaps clarify the effect that qualified immunity has had in these limited
samplings.1
I.

MY INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL RIGHTS

I have certainly received my share of calls seeking representation for
civil rights violations in my 34-year career. Still, I declined most because I
had believed that these cases were too complex, too expensive, and too
uncertain. Therefore, the extent of my civil rights involvement was to refer
most cases to a “civil rights lawyer” and to never hear about them again.
Thus, my foray into the world of civil rights began quite unwarily. The
year was 2004, and my law partner Susan Hutchison and I received a call
from a Spanish-only speaking family member about their abuelo’s death, a
tasering, the beating of a spouse, and something about a pregnant woman.
We found it difficult, even with the aid of an interpreter, to gather the whole
story. What we completely understood, however, was the date of
occurrence, and thus the statute of limitations applicable to the claim would
run out in five days. Susan and I decided to “road trip” from Texas to
Kansas. It was our first civil rights case together. We had some idea how
to handle a § 1983 case, but I was not fully educated on the concept of
qualified immunity. All we knew was that the Mendez family was having
an outdoor family cookout at their home located in a trailer park in Garden
City, Kansas when the trouble started.
While meeting with the clients, we learned that later, after the cookout,
and quite after dark, a police officer appeared on the scene looking for the
son of the grandparents who lived at the residence. The son had allegedly
evaded the police, who now suspected he was at this location as his
pregnant wife had attended the cookout. The son was found inside the
home, hiding in the bathroom, but not understanding a word of English, he
1. Arnone v. County of Dallas County, 29 F.4th 262 (5th Cir. 2022); Dyer v. City of Mesquite,
Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-2638-B, 2016 WL 2346740 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2016); Dyer v. Houston, 964
F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2020); Garcia v. City of Lubbock, 487 F. Supp. 3d 555 (N.D. Tex. 2020); Hobart v.
City of Stafford, 784 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Hobart v. Estrada, 582 F. App’x 348 (5th Cir.
2014); Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Pike, No. 10-19-00098-CV, 2020 WL 6326469 (Tex. App. Oct. 28,
2020); Pratt v. Harris Cty, 822 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2016); Brannan v. City of Mesquite, Civil Action No.
3:19-CV-1263-X, 2020 WL 7344125 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2020); Schrader v. Ruggles, No. 20-11257,
2021 WL 2843848 (5th Cir. Jul. 7, 2021); Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020 (5th Cir. 2021); Allah v.
Milling, 876 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017); Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018); Taylor v.
Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 208 (2020) (per curiam); Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017); Corbitt v.
Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019); Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2019).
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decided to run rather than be apprehended for unknown reasons. He then
ran through the crowd of family members outside and approached the
backyard fence, which was shrouded in complete darkness. As he
attempted to scale the wall before him, he was tasered at the midpoint of his
back and delivered repeated jolts of electricity at 50,000 volts each. He fell
off the fence and lay motionless on the ground. The crowd, particularly the
man’s father, the abuelo, yelled in Spanish into the darkness in the direction
of the officer and his screaming son, “please don’t shoot my son, please
don’t kill my son.” Two additional officers stood among the crowd and
heard the abuelo screaming something very loudly in Spanish toward the
back of the house. One of the two officers drew his service revolver and
fired a 9mm shot into the darkness in the direction of the abuelo. The
pregnant woman was the abuelo’s daughter-in-law, and she had her hands
on the arm of her father-in-law, urging him to come back into the light and
safety. The officer’s bullet narrowly missed the nine-month pregnant
daughter-in-law but severed the spine of the abuelo, causing him to be
instantly paralyzed from just below the shoulder blades and downward. He
fell to the ground immediately, no longer able to stand or walk, where he
bled out because the bullet pierced the main artery in his back and the
fragments caused damage to his heart. The officer who shot the weapon
admitted that on a scale of zero to ten, with zero being total darkness, he
shot into total darkness.
The case involved Monell claims and additional claims that will not be
discussed here, but this was our first adventure into the mine-laden field of
qualified immunity. It was here that I initially waded into the muck and
mire of the bogs that have birthed the legal fiction of qualified immunity.
To add to our frustration over these made-up and invented defenses, it was
not long before we also met the evil twin of qualified immunity, the
completely made-up condition known as excited delirium.2 Excited
delirium, until recently, was an unknown condition or affliction of
mankind.3 Still, it is not listed in the credible medical journals or the DSM
but instead is the go-to legal defense for excessive force cases under § 1983,
second only to qualified immunity.4
“Law enforcement officers nationwide are routinely taught that “excited
delirium” is a condition characterized by the abrupt onset of aggression and
2. Joshua Budhu et al., How “Excited Delirium” is Misused to Justify Police Brutality,
BROOKINGS: HOW WE RISE (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2020/08/10/
how-excited-delirium-is-misused-to-justify-police-brutality.
3. Id.
4. Id.; Brianna da Silva Bhatia et al., “Excited Delirium” and Deaths in Police Custody: The
Deadly Impact of a Baseless Diagnosis, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 2, 2022), https://phr.org/ourwork/resources/excited-delirium/.
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distress, typically in the setting of illicit substance use, often culminating in
sudden death.”5 The alleged diagnosis results from the misapplication of
medical terminology, and instead of being a legitimate medical condition
has instead morphed into a defense to the brutalization of citizens in police
custody.6 Never has anyone attending an exuberant event such as a concert,
a World Cup match, or a Super Bowl been afflicted with excited delirium.
This is because evidently, excited delirium is a condition that only exists
when a police officer uses excessive force, inappropriate restraints, or
restraint methods on a citizen.7 It seems strange that this is the only
physical or mental condition known to mankind that occurs only in the
presence of an officer using excessive force.8
Accountability is an absolute necessity for meaningful criminal
justice reform, and any attempt to provide greater accountability
must confront the doctrine of qualified immunity. This judicial
doctrine, invented by the Supreme Court in the 1960s, protects state
and local officials from liability, even when they act unlawfully, so
long as their actions do not violate “clearly established law.” In
practice, this legal standard is a huge hurdle for civil rights
plaintiffs because it generally requires them to identify not just a
clear legal rule but a prior case with functionally identical facts.9
What is really going on here? I will confess that it is not litigation
against states or state actors because the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution prohibits suing states and state actors even for civil
rights violations nor the even and consistent application of qualified
immunity across the federal circuits or state courts.10 The real-life
experience of this lawyer filing civil rights cases and battling in those
trenches is that there is no consistent application of qualified immunity,
thus, creating chaos and uncertainty in the courts. I proffer that this excuse
from liability and accountability has lost its utility, and I could not say it
better than Schweikert has:
In short, qualified immunity has failed utterly as a matter of law,
doctrine, and public policy. As a legal matter, it has no basis in
5. Budhu et al., supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Budhu et al., supra note 2; da Silva Bhatia et al., supra note 4.
8. Budhu et al., supra note 2.
9. Jay Schweikert, Qualified Immunity: A Legal, Practical, and Moral Failure, CATO INST.
POL’Y ANALYSIS (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/qualified-immunity-legalpractical-moral-failure.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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either the text of Section 1983 or the common‐law background
against which the statute was enacted. The modern doctrine—
especially the “clearly established law” standard—is incapable of
consistent, predictable application, and continues to confuse and
divide lower courts tasked with applying it. And most importantly,
the doctrine regularly permits egregious unconstitutional
misconduct to go unaddressed, exacerbating an ongoing crisis of
accountability in law enforcement more generally. That obviously
hurts the victims of police misconduct, but it also hurts the law
enforcement community itself: when the judiciary routinely permits
police officers to get away with unconscionable constitutional
violations, members of the public can hardly be expected to have
much trust or respect for officers in their community. And that
diminished trust and respect makes the job of policing far more
difficult and dangerous, including for those officers who do strive to
act in a lawful, professional manner.11
Arguably lacking any utility or legitimate purpose, let us now turn to
the definition of qualified immunity and its reach.
II.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. The Definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

When a police officer violates an arrestee’s constitutional rights, the
officer may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 42 U.S.C. § 1983
states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
11. Schweikert, supra note 9.
12. Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 887 (6th Cir. 2007); Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142
F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 1998).
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section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.13
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an officer may be held liable for false arrest14,
false imprisonment15, malicious prosecution16, malicious abuse of process17,
conspiracy to violate due process rights, or excessive force.18 Additionally,
an officer may be held liable as a bystander when the officer observes and
fails to prevent another officer from violating a constitutional right.19
Moreover, depending on the circumstances, an officer may be liable for
damages to others as a result of the constitutional violation.20 Typically, the
constitutional provisions being violated are the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments as well as the due process clause.21 In order to prevail on a §
1983 claim, the plaintiff must show (in addition to a clear violation of a
constitutional right) “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”22
Probable cause acts as a complete defense to a § 1983 claim for false
arrest and malicious prosecution.23 Probable cause is only based on the
facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest.24 Additionally, the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine appears to be unavailable to the
plaintiff.25 At least in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, one case held
that if an officer engages in an unlawful search and seizure, but discovers
contraband, then the officer has probable cause to arrest for the contraband

13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
14. Larson v. Neimi, 9 F.3d 1397, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993).
15. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).
16. Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003).
17. Ismail v. Freeman, 676 F. A’ppx. 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2017).
18. Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2006); Pena v. City of Rio Grande, 879 F.3d
613, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2018).
19. Pena, 879 F.3d at 621 (quoting Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995)).
20. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Amons v. Dist. of Columbia, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 111-12 (D.D.C. 2002).
22. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1994).
23. Harewood v. Braithwaite, 64 F. Supp. 3d 384, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). See Thompson v. Clark,
142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022) (This recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States has caused
considerable concern among police officers and prosecutors. These law enforcement professionals who
arrest and charge criminal defendants daily on the basis of probable cause may worry that they are now
more vulnerable to malicious prosecution claims when charges are dismissed rather than pursued to
trial.).
24. Harewood, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 397.
25. Price v. City of Philadelphia, 239 F. Supp. 3d 876, 889 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
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found.26 Lastly, if the arrestee, in any way, pleads guilty, then the
retroactive effect of probable cause is established.27
B. The History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In the Enforcement Acts of 1871, also known as the “Ku Klux
Klan Acts,” Congress specifically held that groups of people could
be liable in court for violating the constitutional rights of other
Americans, including public officials. “This was an effort to help
protect black Americans who were the frequent targets of horrific
violence, including lynching, and that in some cases public officials
condoned. . . . People refer to lawsuits against the police alleging
civil rights violations as §1983 claims. This is because the civil
rights movement of the 1960s reinvigorated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the
Ku Klux Klan Acts.28
The goal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was to provide a remedy for people
whose constitutional rights were violated by an official’s abuse of power
while acting under the color of state law.29 This statute was intended to act
as a safety net for victims unable to obtain redress in a state court.30
Congress believed this statute would deter these types of violations and
create a balance between individual rights and the protection of state and
local governments.31 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from using excessive force when
apprehending a suspect or making an arrest, subjecting officers who use
excessive force to civil liability as in the 1958 case, Monroe v. Pape, in
which the Supreme Court held that a police officer acted “under color of
law” in using unreasonable force and, as such, could be liable for violating
the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.32 The Supreme Court has held that
a Fourth Amendment violation on its own – regardless of § 1983 – can lead
to civil liability in the 1971 case Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

26. Id. at 899-900.
27. Chillemi v. Town of Southampton, 943 F. Supp. 2d 365, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
28. Qualified Immunity: Both Sides of the Debate, FINDLAW (Sept. 21, 2021), https://supreme.
findlaw.com/supreme-court-insights/pros-vs-cons-of-qualified-immunity—both-sides-of
debate.html#:~:text=Qualified%20Immunity%3A%20Both%20Sides%20of%20the%20Debate&text=
Qualified%20immunity%20provides%20protection%20from,to%20hold%20bad%20actors%20accounta
ble [hereinafter Both Sides of the Debate].
29. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
30. McNeese v. Bd. of Ed. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
31. McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 1996).
32. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167-72, 187, 259 (1961); Schweikert, supra note 9.
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Agents.33 It is noteworthy to mention that nowhere in the text of the civil
rights statute is immunity of any kind permitted.34
C. The Definition of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity provides protection from civil lawsuits for
law enforcement officers and other public officials. It attempts to
balance the need to allow public officials to do their jobs with the
need to hold bad actors accountable. Proponents of qualified
immunity argue that without a liability shield, public officials and
law enforcement officers would be constantly sued and secondguessed in courts. Critics say the doctrine has led to law
enforcement officers being able to violate the rights of citizens,
particularly disenfranchised citizens, without repercussion.35
An officer may raise the qualified immunity defense in response to any
type of § 1983 claim.36 To preclude this defense, the plaintiff must show
that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.37 In some
instances, such as the use of deadly force, the burden will shift to the officer
to show that his conduct was reasonable.38 “How qualified immunity
works” is to require the courts to “employ a two-part test to determine
whether qualified immunity applies. If the answer to both questions is yes,
then the public official does not get immunity.
• Did the officer violate a Constitutional right?
• Did the officer know that their actions violated a ‘clearly established
right’?”39
“The next issue is to determine when a right is ‘clearly established.’”40
“Under the current doctrine, a right is clearly established when the Supreme
Court or the relevant federal appeals court has already treated the conduct as
unconstitutional, or where a public official’s conduct is ‘obviously
unlawful.’”41 But, “[i]n 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court told lower courts
[they] could skip the first part of the test at its discretion,” and many now
do.42
33. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-96
(1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
35. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. Lanigan v. Village of E. Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1997).
38. Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 2002).
39. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The result is that judges now look to past court cases to see whether
there is a similar set of facts on record that would put the officer on
notice that their actions violated the “clearly established” statutory
or constitutional rights of another. The result is that the facts of a
situation alleging police misconduct are highly relevant to when
qualified immunity applies.”43
While performing discretionary duties, if an officer does not violate a
clearly established constitutional or statutory right that a reasonable person
would have known, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.44
Courts typically interpret “clearly established law” very specifically.45 The
plaintiff must show that the law is so clearly established that any reasonable
officer would have known they were violating a constitutional right.46
Courts even go further as to say that if reasonable officers could disagree
over the legality of the officer’s actions, then qualified immunity applies.47
It should also be noted that if reasonable officers could disagree as to
whether probable cause was established, then the officer is still entitled to
qualified immunity.48 Qualified immunity also may be applicable when an
officer acts in good faith and in reliance on other officers.49 Finally, an
officer is also entitled to qualified immunity when the officer is reasonably
“mistaken” in regard to the legality of his actions.50
D. The History of Qualified Immunity
Notably, “the statute on its face does not provide for any immunities.”51
The operative language just says that any person acting under state authority
which causes the violation of any federal right “. . . shall be liable to the
party injured.”52 Qualified immunity, a judicially created doctrine, if
applicable, is an absolute bar to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.53 However, the
Supreme Court held that the “tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in
the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
(1976).

Id.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 205 (2004).
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742-47 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Jaquez v. City of New York, 706 F. A’ppx. 709, 714 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 741; Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, at 163-64 (1992); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-21
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‘Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the
doctrine.’”54
The Supreme Court, the above holding notwithstanding, first recognized
a need for liability protection in Pierson v. Ray in 1967.55 In this case, the
Court excused the officer from liability despite making an unconstitutional
arrest, and held that an officer should not be liable when he acted in good
faith under a statute that was believed to be constitutional, also stating that it
would be unreasonable to punish an officer for not accurately “predicting
the future course of constitutional law.”56
The Warren Court had two reasons for giving qualified
immunity in [Pierson v. Ray]. First, it wrote that courts had been
granting qualified immunity for many years prior to §1983, and that
Congress did not specifically ban qualified immunity in that
section. The Warren Court then expanded that qualified immunity
to acts undertaken by public officials in “good faith.” Legal
scholars have since questioned this reading of the law. Secondly,
and perhaps more important to the Warren Court, the Supreme
Court feared that police would not seek to arrest suspects or do their
jobs diligently if they feared being held liable. “A policeman’s lot
is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with
dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause,
and being mulcted in damages if he does” Chief Justice Earl Warren
wrote.57
Fifteen years later, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald[,] the Supreme
Court greatly expanded the doctrine to become closer to what it is
today. In that case, an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court said that
public officials have immunity unless the official knew or should
have known that their actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. It replaced the previous “good faith” test with something
more “objective.” This test is now the analysis courts use when
determining if qualified immunity protects an officer from a
lawsuit.58
[In Scheuer v. Rhodes,] personal representatives of the estates
of students who were killed on the campus of a state-controlled
54.
(1967)).
55.
56.
57.
58.

Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
Id. at 557.
Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
Id.
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university, brought [. . .} damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Governor, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National
Guard, various other Guard officers and enlisted members, and the
university president, charging that those officials, acting under color
of state law, “intentionally, recklessly, willfully and wantonly”
caused an unnecessary Guard deployment on the campus and
ordered the Guard members to perform allegedly illegal acts
resulting in the students’ deaths.59
In this Kent State University case , the district court dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment immunity and jurisdictional grounds.60 The Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal based on the common-law doctrine of
executive immunity.61 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and recognized that the common law immunity afforded to police officers is
not absolute and that such “qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government . . . dependent upon the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to
be based.”62 The Court gave a policy explanation by stating that officials
must be given protection, and adopted a functional test to determine the
scope of immunity through the “scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office”.63 The author of this paper asks whether the functionality test,
though an important part of the court’s rhetoric, has rarely been used to
prevent qualified immunity?
Thus, if qualified immunity has no constitutional or statutory basis,
where did this idea of immunity originate? I thought the Revolutionary War
was fought because the king was not accountable for his wrongs and this
country was to be created to rectify that situation.
1. A Comparison of the History of Immunity in the
United Kingdom and the United States
Immunity in the United Kingdom
Historically, the general rule in the United Kingdom has been
that the Crown has never been liable to be prosecuted or proceeded

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232, 245, 247.
Id. at 246-47; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
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against in either criminal or civil cases.64 The only means by which
civil proceedings could be brought were:
• by way of a petition of right, which was dependent on the grant of the
royal fiat (i.e., permission);
• by suits against the Attorney General for a declaration; or
• by actions against ministers or government departments where an Act
of Parliament has specifically provided that immunity be waived.
The position was drastically altered by the Crown Proceedings Act
1947 which made the Crown (when acting as the government)
liable as of right in proceedings where it was previously only liable
by virtue of a grant of a fiat. With limited exceptions, this had the
effect of allowing proceedings for tort and contract to be brought
against the Crown.65 Proceedings to bring writs of mandamus and
prohibition were always available against ministers, because their
actions derived from the royal prerogative. Criminal proceedings
are still prohibited from being brought against Her Majesty’s
Government unless expressly permitted by the Crown Proceedings
Act.66 As the Crown Proceedings Act only affected the law in
respect of acts carried on by or on behalf of the British government,
the monarch remains personally immune from criminal and civil
actions.67 However, civil proceedings can, in theory, still be
brought using the two original mechanisms outlined above–by
petition of right or by suit against the Attorney General for a
declaration.68
[Additionally,] [t]he monarch is immune from arrest in all cases;
members of the royal household are immune from arrest in civil
proceedings.69 No arrest can be made “in the monarch’s presence”
or within the “verges” of a royal palace. When a royal palace is
used as a residence (regardless of whether the monarch is actually
living there at the time), judicial processes cannot be executed
within that palace.70 The monarch’s goods cannot be taken under a
64. Sovereign Immunity, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_immunity (last
updated Aug. 24, 2022) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity]; Crown Proceedings and Crown Practice, §
101, 12(1) HALS. STAT.
65. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Constitutional Law and Human Rights, § 382, 8 (1)
HALS. STAT.
66. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64 (citing Maurice Sunkin, Crown Immunity from Criminal
Liability in English Law, PUBLIC LAW 716 (Winter 2003)).
67. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Crown and Royal Family, § 53, 12(1) HALS. STAT.
68. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Crown and Royal Family, § 56, 12(1) HALS. STAT.
69. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Crown and Royal Family, § 52, 12(1) HALS. STAT.
70. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Crown and Royal Family, § 53, 12(1) HALS. STAT.
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writ of execution, nor can distress be levied on land in their
possession. Chattels owned by the Crown, but present on another’s
land, cannot be taken in execution or for distress. The Crown is not
subject to foreclosure.45]
[However,] [i]n United States law, state, federal and tribal
governments generally enjoy immunity from lawsuits.71 Local
governments typically enjoy immunity from some forms of suits,
particularly in tort. In the US, sovereign immunity falls into two
categories:72
• Absolute immunity:73 pursuant to which a government actor may not
be sued for the allegedly wrongful act, even if that person acted
maliciously or in bad faith; and
• Qualified immunity: pursuant to which a government actor is shielded
from liability only if specific conditions are met, as specified in
statute or case law. . . .
Judicial immunity is a specific form of absolute immunity.74
Federal Sovereign Immunity
The federal government has sovereign immunity and may not
be sued anywhere in the United States unless it has waived its
immunity or consented to suit.75 The United States has waived
sovereign immunity to a limited extent, mainly through the Federal
Tort Claims Act, which waives the immunity if a tortious act of a
federal employee causes damage, and the Tucker Act, which waives
the immunity over claims arising out of contracts to which the
federal government is a party.76 The United States as a sovereign is
immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents to being sued.77
71. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sovereign_immunity.
72. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Aaron Larson, Governmental Immunity and Auto
Accidents, EXPERTLAW (May 7, 2018), https://www.expertlaw.com/library/car-accidents/governmentalimmunity.html.
73. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64. Absolute immunity applies to acts that, if subject to
challenge, would significantly affect the operation of government. See, e.g., Michael Shenkman, Talking
About Speech or Debate: Revisiting Legislative Immunity, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351 (2013); J.
Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879 (1980).
74. Sovereign immunity, supra note 64; Qualified Immunity, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qualified_immunity.
75. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; William Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting
Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 93 (1953).
76. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Evan Zoldan, The King Is Dead, Long Live the King!:
Sovereign Immunity and the Curious Case of Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, 38 CONN L. REV.
465, 482 (2006).
77. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
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The United States Supreme Court in Price v. United States
observed: “It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The government is
not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability in the
suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute
authorizing it.”78
E. The Metamorphosis of Qualified Immunity
1. Good Faith Exception (from accountability)
The next significant case regarding the development of qualified
immunity was Wood v. Strickland, in which the Supreme Court
implemented both subjective and objective elements of qualified immunity,
and reasoned that the defendant had to act with good faith; however, the
defendant’s ignorance would not protect him or her from well-established
law.79 Currently, this is not the case; subjective intent is not considered by
the Court.80 Whether a defendant acts in good faith or with intentional
malice does not affect his or her entitlement to qualified immunity.81
The modern test for qualified immunity remains established in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald (1982).82 Prior to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted immunity to government officials only if: (1) the official
believed in good faith that their conduct was lawful, and (2) the conduct
was objectively reasonable.83 The Harlow Court announced the rule that
defendants are immune from liability under Section 1983 unless they violate
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”84 The Supreme Court, following Harlow, has
attempted to articulate the correct analysis. The lower courts remain deeply
divided and inconsistent on the nebulous question of how to determine
when rights are “clearly established.” For example, the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits—like the Second Circuit—have effectively held that
overcoming qualified immunity requires a prior case.85
2. The Exact Same Event Standard
Applying qualified immunity,
78. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 64; Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899).
79. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
80. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
81. Id.
82. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
83. Wood, 420 U.S. at 318 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974)).
84. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
85. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 10; Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28. See Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818; Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 552 (6th Cir. 2017), Young v. Borders, 850 F.3d 1274 (11th
Cir. 2017).
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[t]he Supreme Court has told lower courts to waive qualified
immunity in cases that are very similar. It is not enough to show
that a previous case denied an officer qualified immunity for
broadly similar circumstances or actions. Instead, the facts must be
“sufficiently clear” that a reasonable officer would understand that
they are violating a constitutional or statutory right.86
“Unfortunately, the sort of misapplication of qualified immunity
employed by the district court—construing ‘clearly established law’ to
effectively require a case with identical facts—is no isolated error, but
rather part of an all-too-common practice in lower courts.”87
[Considering] one example of thousands, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has distinguished between an officer firing at a dog
surrounded by children, hitting and injuring a child, and an officer
firing at a truck, instead hitting a passenger. In both cases the
officer fired at a target for questionable reasons, resulting in injury
to the accidentally hit victim. However, the Eleventh Circuit said
the two were dissimilar enough that the officer who shot the child
was given qualified immunity, whereas a previous court found that
the officer who fired at the truck did not get qualified immunity.88
3. Plainly Incompetent Factor
Qualified immunity is not the same as absolute immunity. In
other words, there are circumstances in which a public official can
be held accountable for constitutional violations in civil court.
However, in the Supreme Court’s own words, qualified immunity is
an officer-friendly doctrine that protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”89
“The doctrine of qualified immunity amounts to a kind of generalized
good-faith defense for all public officials, as it protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”90

86. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
87. Brief of Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Timpa v.
Dillard et al., 20 F.4th 1020 (5th Cir. 2021) (No. 20-10876) [hereinafter Cato Timpa Brief]; see also
Timpa, 20 F.4th at 1029.
88. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
89. Id.
90. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 6 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
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4. Common Law Defenses
Statutes generally “will not be interpreted to extinguish by implication
longstanding legal defenses.”91 The relevant question is whether the
common law of 1871 included general immunities for state agents that
“were so well established” as to justify the doctrine of qualified immunity
today.92 “The clearest example of this principle” comes from the 1804
Supreme Court case, Little v. Barreme.93 That case “involved a claim
against an American naval captain[, George Little,] who captured a Danish
ship off the coast of France” under war-like conditions where “President
Adams had issued . . . instructions to . . . seize ships coming from” France.94
Little wanted to use his reliance on the president’s instructions as a defense
to the proposition of his unlawful seizure of the vessel.95 Chief Justice John
Marshall authored the opinion, which ultimately rejected the very rationale
that today supports the doctrine of qualified immunity.96 Marshall admits
that in the beginning, he favored the doctrine based in part on the good faith
reliance on the president’s order and that the ship was “seized with pure
intention.”97 The court held, however, that the “defense was [one of]
legality, not [of] good faith.”98
III.

THE TRUTH OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The truth of qualified immunity has been to thwart the efforts of
plaintiffs seeking civil damages for constitutional violations against their
client at the hands of officials purporting to act under color of law.99 Many
Section 1983 cases originate as a criminal case or a police and citizen
encounter.100 Since its creation, the doctrine of qualified immunity has
changed from the historical framework on which it is supposed to be
grounded.101 “Most importantly, the Supreme Court originally rejected the
application of a good-faith defense to Section 1983 itself. In Myers v.
Anderson, the Supreme Court considered a suit against election officers that
91. Id.; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988).
92. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 6.
93. Id. at 7; see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804); see also James E. Pfander
& Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability
in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1863 (2010) (“No case better illustrates the standards to
which federal government officers were held than Little v. Barreme.”).
94. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 7-8.
98. Id. at 8.
99. See infra Part IV.
100. Id.
101. See generally Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 6.
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had refused to register black voters under a ‘grandfather clause’ statute, in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”102 “This forceful rejection of any
general good-faith defense ‘is exactly the logic of the founding-era cases,
alive and well in the federal courts after Section 1983’s enactment.’”103
The text of Section 1983 does not mention immunity.104 The common
law of 1871 did not include any freestanding defense for all public
officials.105
In the context of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court correctly
frames the issue as whether or not “[c]ertain immunities were so
well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we
presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish’ them”. But the historical record shows that the
common law of 1871 did not, in fact, provide for such
immunities.106
If its creation does not come from the statutory or constitutional basis,
where did qualified immunity come from? The courts.107 The courts
changed the basic premise throughout the nineteenth century that public
officials were liable for unconstitutional misconduct.108 Today, we
frequently arrive at the conclusion that the ever-changing doctrine of
qualified immunity is not tied to any lawful justification and needs
correction.109 To understand the actual impact of qualified immunity, it is
useful to examine some current effects of this doctrine.
The modern doctrine of qualified immunity is completely untethered
from any statutory or historical baseline.110 “[T]he fact that qualified
immunity itself is so deeply at odds with the text and history of Section
102. Id. at 8; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 380 (1915).
103. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 9 (quoting William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity
Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 58 (2018)).
104. Id. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
105. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 2.
106. Id. at 6; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554–55 (1967)) (citation omitted).
107. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
108. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 2.
109. Id.; see, e.g., Allah v Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 51 (2nd Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed 139 S. Ct. 49
(2018); see also, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity
jurisprudence.”); see generally Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Assault on Civil Rights,
DISSENT (Fall 2017), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/supreme-court-assault-civil-rightssection-1983; see generally Baude, supra note 103, at 51; see generally Jon O. Newman, Here’s a Better
Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-better-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016
/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.html.
110. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 5.
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1983 should make appellate courts especially wary about countenancing
extensions of the doctrine beyond the contours of existing precedent . . .
.”111 The literal text of Section 1983 makes no mention of any immunities,
qualified or otherwise. In addition, “the relevant history establishes
a baseline of strict liability for constitutional violations—at most providing
a good‐faith defense against claims analogous to common‐law torts.”112 Yet
in 1915, the Supreme Court confirmed that Section 1983 provides for no
general good‐faith defenses before reversing itself without explanation more
than half a century later.113 “Yet qualified immunity functions today as an
across‐the‐board defense, based on a ‘clearly established law’ standard that
was unheard of before the late twentieth century.”114
A. The Current Consequences of Immunity
1. Police Shooting Statistics
The Washington Post has tracked shootings since 2015, reporting more
than 5,000 incidents since their tracking began.115 The database can also
classify people in various categories, including race, age, weapon, etc.116
For 2019, it reported a total of 999 people “shot and killed by police”.117
Qualified immunity would apply to each one of these shootings were they to
be filed as a civil rights claim.
2. The Issue of Time Delay
Time delay poses a serious problem for litigants and the courts.118 The
current application of qualified immunity results in a one-sided litigation
advantage to the government defendants because of the availability of an
interlocutory appeal.119 Courts often sustain defendants’ F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
Motions to Dismiss prior to any discovery in the case.120 Courts also sustain
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Id. at 8; see generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018); Crawford‐
El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
114. Cato Timpa Brief, supra note 87, at 13.
115. Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
investigations/police-shootings-database/ (last updated June 13, 2022); see also John Sullivan et al., In
Fatal Shootings by Police, 1 in 5 Officers’ Names Go Undisclosed, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/in-fatal-shootings-by-police-1-in-5-officers-nam es-goundisclosed/2016/03/31/4bb08bc8-ea10-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html.
116. Tate et al., supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Joanna C. Schwartz, Symposium, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1797, 1825 (2018).
119. Id. at 1803.
120. Id. at 1835 n.207.
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defendants’ motions for summary judgment with alarming regularity.121
Thus, these cases can go on to the interlocutory appeal level before ever
having a trial.122 To further complicate the matter, the Supreme Court has
held that qualified immunity is not just a legal defense against liability but
that it is also intended to grant immunity from lawsuits altogether.123 Thus,
a plaintiff can find his claim completely dismissed before ever having a
trial.124 Because of years and years of delay, high costs and expenses are
incurred in the process. The plaintiff often must literally win twice, at the
interlocutory appeal level and then at the trial court or jury trial level.125
These time delays and financial outlays often exhaust the ability to press
forward for clients and their counsel alike.
IV.

CASE STUDIES FROM HUTCHISON & FOREMAN, PLLC

This part builds upon various sources from our actual cases and should
therefore be considered a series of illustrative examples to explain and
clarify the effect of qualified immunity in these cases.
A. Arnone126
Let me tell you a story you will not believe . . . happen[ed] in
2021. . . . Dallas County is so powerful that it appoints its own
County policymakers to create and ratify local policies which
circumvent and ignore state law, the federal Constitution and
individual civil rights of its citizens. The District Attorney . . . ,
duly appointed policymaker for Dallas County (hereinafter
“County”), authorizes a policy which allows the DA to manufacture
probable cause out of inadmissible evidence, . . . to have Dallas
County citizens arrested in violation of their fundamental
constitutional rights. This is not the first time a facially
unconstitutional policy was employed, and Dallas County has
allowed its District Attorney policymaker to violate the
constitutional rights of the citizens of this county. We are here
because they have done it again, and again. In Crane v. State of
Tex., 759 F.2d 412, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1985) this Court upheld the
plaintiff[‘]s action challenging Dallas County’s policy and practice
121. Id. at 1811.
122. Id. at 1803.
123. William Baude, Reply, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified Immunity?, 74 STAN. L. REV.
115, 124 (2022).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Arnone v. Cnty. of Dallas Cnty., 29 F.4th 262 (5th Cir. 2022).
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of issuing misdemeanor capias warrants without a finding of
probable cause. Crane held “the record plainly shows that the
Dallas County District Attorney was alone responsible for the
County system and could change it at will.” “His authority to
establish County procedures for issuing misdemeanor capias
derived from the County office to which he was elected by County
voters. That he had such authority is patent and admitted by the
District Attorney himself stating that he [‘]has established policies
and procedures of an administrative nature only as to the filing and
processing of criminal information in Dallas County.[‘]”
During a contested divorce, Arnone was charged with
allegations of aggravated sexual assault of his son on November 14,
2002, that allegedly occurred nearly five years earlier on July 1,
1997. ROA.325-329. The Dallas County District Attorney’s office
hand altered the information and changed the charge on the day of
court. The DA then presented Arnone with a plea deal, and he
entered an open plea of nolo contendere to a single non-sexual
charge of injury to a child. ROA.323. The plea agreement is signed
by an assistant District Attorney under the name of “Bill Hill
Criminal District Attorney Dallas County.” ROA.304-305. The
trial court placed Arnone on ten-years deferred adjudication
community supervision, but withheld adjudication and made no
finding of guilt. Thus, there was no conviction. “A defendant on
deferred adjudication has not been found guilty.” Donovan v. State,
68 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
What is critical for this Court to realize, and is also appropriate
for judicial notice under FRE 201, is that Arnone would have never
legally come back to court after his deferred plea and therefore
would never be found guilty of any crime unless and until a valid
violation of deferred probation is alleged, then that violation must
be presented to a neutral magistrate or judge in order to find
probable cause to arrest and only then should a warrant for the
arrest and reincarceration of Arnone be issued. But this is not what
occurred here. The DA moved to proceed with an adjudication of
guilt on the original charge, manufactured probable cause
(polygraph) to obtain an arrest warrant, incarcerated Arnone on this
unconstitutional arrest warrant for weeks and the trial court later
adjudicated Arnone guilty and sentenced him to prison based solely
on the same inadmissible evidence. There is no way this is
Constitutional.
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Arnone was erroneously placed on the sex offender caseload
and required to submit to polygraph tests. Arnone disputes that this
was ever mentioned, or a part of the plea as explained in a pleading
filed by his trial counsel S. Becker, now a State District Judge.
ROA.972-976. Nonetheless, Arnone was later removed from the
sex offender caseload due solely to his polygraph test results by the
Dallas County Probation Office. Upon learning of this action from
the Probation office, the Dallas County DA, in accordance with
County policy, then moved to adjudicate guilt, and requested that
Arnone be “cited to appear” aka warrant issued, and Arnone was
arrested by the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office. ROA.1353. The
record reveals that Arnone was credited for time served from March
20, 2003 where he remained in custody until sentenced to prison
upon an adjudication on May 23, 2003. ROA.843. This tells us
then, the approximate date Bill Hill requested the arrest warrant be
issued, March 13, 2003, and when it was served and Arnone
arrested, March 23, 2003. ROA.969,843. In April 2003, the trial
court adjudicated Arnone’s guilt and sentenced him to prison for
fifteen years. Arnone filed a direct appeal because of his
adjudication and finding of guilt after his probation was revoked
and the DA prosecuted the appeal under the name of Bill Hill.
ROA.308, 331-333. Arnone filed for federal habeas relief on the
basis of actual innocence. ROA.311-316. Arnone served thirteen
years, seven months, and 22 days in prison and, during that time,
filed direct appeals and writs of habeas corpus. A jailhouse inmate
freed Arnone on a writ of habeas corpus based on the same facts
and issues presented herein.
In October 2015, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCRA)
granted an application for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding the
adjudication of Arnone’s guilt, based on his dismissal from sex
offender treatment as a result of failed polygraph tests, was
improper, i.e[.] against state and federal law and/or
unconstitutional. The CCRA set aside Arnone’s conviction of guilt,
and Arnone was released from custody. ROA.318-321. The
mandate from the CCRA was mailed on November 2, 2015,
however Arnone was not aware or released until after November
13, 2015. ROA.1074-1077. A factual timeline was presented by
Plaintiff and will not be restated here but which accurately sets forth
the relevant timelines. ROA.1041. Arnone asserts direct liability
against Dallas County for its unconstitutional conduct as set forth in
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detail in Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended Complaint and seeks reversal of
the order dismissing his claims.127
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.128
B. Dyer129
This case arises out of the death of Graham Dyer, who was in custody at
the Mesquite police and jail and then transported from jail to the hospital
with fatal head injuries in August 2013.130 The district court dismissed on
the grounds of qualified immunity.131
Plaintiffs Kathy and Robert Dyer (“the Dyers”) appeal the
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds of their deliberateindifference claims against paramedics and police officers
employed by the City of Mesquite, Texas. The Dyers’ claims arise
out of the death of their 18-year-old son, Graham, from selfinflicted head trauma while in police custody. . . . Graham died
after violently bashing his head over 40 times against the interior
of a patrol car while being transported to jail.132
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
reversed in part and remanded back to the trial court where the case is
awaiting trial.133
C. Garcia134
This 1983 case against the Lubbock Police Department and Lubbock
County Sheriff’s office “arises out of the wrongful arrest, incarceration[,]
and refusal to provide medical care for Plaintiff Raul Garcia.”135
On May 18, 2018, Raul Garcia was a fifty-eight year old man
married . . . with children.
Mr. Garcia was diagnosed as a diabetic in 2017[,] . . . [while] he
was diagnosed with cancer and began undergoing chemotherapy.
127. Brief for Appellant at 2-6, Arnone, 29 F.4th 262 (No. 21-10597).
128. Arnone, 29 F.4th at 264.
129. Dyer v. City of Mesquite, 2016 WL 2346740 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2016); Dyer v. Houston, 964
F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2020)
130. Dyer, 964 F.3d at 377, 379.
131. Id. at 377.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Garcia v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 487 F. Supp.3d 355 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
135. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at ¶ 21, Garcia, 487 F. Supp.3d 355 (No. 5:20-cv-00053-H).
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As part of that therapy, Mr. Garcia had a port inserted into his chest
for ongoing chemotherapy.
A chemotherapy “port” is an
implantable reservoir with a thin, silicone tube that attaches to a
vein. It is centrally placed under the skin near a large vein in the
upper chest and provides a medication delivery system and remains
in place . . . [if] necessary for the treatment regimen. It is clearly
visible to an observer. . . .
Mr. Garcia followed his doctor’s recommendations and ordered
two bracelets: one to inform responders of his port (for
chemotherapy) and one to inform responders of his diabetes. The
very purpose of these bracelets was to provide notice to responders
of Mr. Garcia’s conditions if he was unable to do so. One bracelet
was stamped with “Port” to inform/warn responders that he had a
port inserted into his chest. The other bracelet included a medical
alert symbol and a specific alert for “Diabetes.” . . .
Garcia entered the United Supermarket to get food for himself
and his wife—to take back to her at the hospital where she was
undergoing cancer treatment.
While in the supermarket, Mr. Garcia began experiencing the
beginning of a hyperglycemic episode. He began experiencing
dizziness, confusion[,] and difficulty communicating. . . .
Lubbock police officers Mark Ellison and Joshua Conklin . . .
[approached Garcia, who] was outside . . . leaning on a railing. He
was wearing . . . his medical bracelets on both wrists. . . . .
Mr. Garcia was totally compliant and did nothing to resist the
officers. . . .
Despite the fact that Mr. Garcia’s medical bracelets were
clearly visible (and as proven by events, there was no odor of
alcohol or any other indicia of ingestion of alcohol other than
confusion), the officers did not ask a single medical question or
make inquiry as to Mr. Garcia’s medical condition. . . .
Mr. Garcia made no indication that he intended to drive or do
anything to endanger either himself or anyone else. He was simply
sick and confused.
Defendants Ellison and Conklin then determined to arrest Mr.
Garcia for public intoxication. . . .
At approximately 1:36 p.m. (about six minutes after arriving),
the officers placed Mr. Garcia in the back of Officer Ellison’s patrol
car.
During transport to the jail, the video shows that Mr. Garcia
went in and out of consciousness, slumping over in the back of the
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vehicle. During that time, Officer Ellison (driving) continually
beat on the partition with his hand, and yelled “wake up!” and “sit
up!” over and over again. Despite Mr. Garcia’s obvious continuing
distress and inability to communicate coherently, Officer Ellison
made no attempt to obtain a medical assessment or medical
treatment. . . .
Inexplicably, while Mr. Garcia was not booked in at the jail and
he was not medically screened, his medical bracelets were removed
and he was placed in jail overalls. . . .
[Garcia was found unresponsive in a cell.] Mr. Garcia was
noted to be comatose upon arrival at University Medical Center and
immediately intubated.
He was diagnosed with diabetic
ketoacidosis—a life threatening complication of diabetes and
treated with medication that ultimately saved his life, but not before
he suffered complications and some permanent effects of the
emergent condition and failure to receive timely medical treatment.
...
As a result of wrongful arrest and failure to obtain proper
medical care, Mr. Garcia suffered significant injury and
impairment.136
The district court dismissed based on F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions on the
grounds of lacking deliberate indifference and qualified immunity.137 The
case is pending an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
D. Hobart138
This lawsuit arises from the death of Aaron Hobart . . . , son of
Plaintiffs Steve and Pam Hobart. . . . Aaron suffered from
a schizoaffective disorder, which resulted in delusions. Aaron’s
mental health was deteriorating in the days, weeks, and months
leading up to February 18, 2009. . . . [The] officer believed that
Aaron was “experiencing a mental health crisis” . . . . [Aaron began
speaking] in an alternate voice—which Mr. Hobart described as
“hoarse, whispered,” and “raspy”—and claimed that “he knew all
the secrets of the universe,” while other people were “all just
ignorant”. After being transferred temporarily to a mental health
136. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 135, at ¶¶ 21-23, 25, 29-31, 34, 36-40, 47, 51-52,
54, 58, 79.
137. Garcia, 487 F. Supp.3d at 576-78.
138. Hobart v. City of Stafford, 784 F. Supp.2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Hobart v. Estrada, 582 F.
App’x. 348 (5th Cir. 2014).
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facility, Aaron was prescribed medication for his schizoaffective
disorder and released on September 13, 2007. . . .
On February 18, 2009, Aaron refused to leave his room to go to
his doctor’s appointment. . . . Aaron [was] speaking “belligerently
and abusively” in the same raspy alternate voice. Mrs. Hobart also
called Dr. Moreland, who told her not to press Aaron to attend the
appointment that day so that Aaron could calm down. Dr.
Moreland also sent a follow-up email to Mrs. Hobart giving her
instructions on how to administer Aaron’s medication, and
providing information from the Houston Crisis Intervention Team
(“CIT”) website regarding how to request emergency help. The
information stated that the CIT program “educates patrol officers
about mental illness and tactics and techniques to help verbally deescalate situations involving individuals in serious mental health
crises,” that one should call for a CIT officer “[w]hen the situation
involves a person in a serious mental health crisis,” and that, if the
situation is an emergency, one should call 911 and request a CIT
officer. It also noted that “If the person is mentally ill and poses a
substantial risk of imminent harm to self or others, Texas Peace
officers have the authority to take the individual to a facility for an
emergency mental health evaluation, even if the person
is involuntary. The officer may use whatever force he needs to get
the individual to the facility for evaluation.” . . .
Based on the instructions in Dr. Moreland’s email,
Mrs. Hobart called 911 and requested a “CIT officer” . . . . The
operator informed her that an officer would come to the Hobarts’
home. . . . Officers Garcia and Claunch from the SPD were the
primary officers dispatched on the call, but Officer Estrada was the
first to arrive at the Hobarts’ home. . . .
The video shows Officer Estrada enter[ing] the Hobarts’ home
by himself at approximately 15:07:59 on the video’s clock. . . .
Immediately after he enters the home, one can hear Officer Estrada
conversing with Mrs. Hobart. At approximately 15:08:15, one can
hear noises, and Officer Estrada shouts, “Stop!” and “Get back!”
several times. At approximately 15:08:20, one can hear gunshots.
Officer Estrada then begins shouting, . . . “Shots fired!” and “Oh
my god!” and Mrs. Hobart begins screaming loudly. . . . .
Officer Estrada fired six or seven bullets in the Hobarts’ home,
and four struck Aaron: one in the back of the right upper neck, one
in the right lower back, one in the back of the right hip, and one in
the right middle back . . . . At the time of his death on February 18,
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2009, Aaron was nineteen years old, stood five-foot-nine-inches
tall, and weighed 166 pounds. He was barefoot and dressed in
shorts and a t-shirt. There is no suggestion that he had any type of
weapon at that time. Officer Estrada stands six-foot-one-inch tall
and weighs 190 pounds.139
This is an appeal of the district court’s denial of a motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in an
excessive force case arising from the shooting death of a mentally
ill teenager after the parents sought the assistance of a Crisis
Intervention Team officer in transporting the teenager to the
hospital.140
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the denial of
the district court to grant the dismissal and instead dismissed the issue of
deliberate indifference in qualified immunity.141
E. Pike142
In an effort to avoid the revolving door of qualified immunity
dismissals in federal court, Pike’s case was filed under the Texas Tort
Claims Act, where the state has waived immunity for the use of personal
property.143
Pike is an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
housed in the OB Ellis Unit Trustee Camp. While incarcerated
there, he worked on the unit’s 20,000 acre farm, under the
supervision of TDCJ employees, including both his direct
supervisor and the supervisor over maintenance. The tractors that
the inmates were required to use were always in general disrepair.
Most of the gauges didn’t work. Many of the hydraulics didn’t
work and most did not have operating lights. . . . In mid May 2018,
inmate Danny Ware was assigned to a particular tractor. While he
was climbing onto the tractor, a defective battery box flew open, he
fell to the ground and hurt his leg. A TDCJ safety officer inspected
the tractor and determined that the cause of the injury was a defect
in the tractor. . . .
139. Hobart, 784 F. Supp.2d at 739-41, 743 (citations omitted).
140. Hobart, 582 F. App’x. at 349-50.
141. Id. at 359.
142. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Pike, No. 10-19-00098-CV, 2020 WL 6326469 (Tex. App.
Oct. 28, 2020).
143. Plaintiff James Pike’s First Amended Original Petition, and Request for Disclosure at 3, Pike,
2020 WL 6326469 (No. 10-19-00098-CV); Pike, 2020 WL 6326469, at *2.
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On or about June 27, 2018, Mr. Pike was assigned by his TDCJ
supervisor to the same tractor that Ware had been injured on. Pike
was directed to use the tractor for the planting, harvesting, and
maintenance of row crops, his tasks assigned by the TDCJ during
his incarceration at the direction of TDCJ supervisors.
As Mr. Pike climbed onto the tractor, the battery box again
flipped up and threw Pike off of the tractor. He hit his face on the
tractor engine as he fell, sustaining an orbital fracture and ocular
muscle entrapment.
After a few seconds on the ground, Mr. Pike was able to collect
himself and fully understand the immense pain emanating from his
face. When Mr. Pike touched his face, he noticed a substantial
volume of blood coming from the injured area, as well as the rapid
swelling that was occurring in his left eye.
Pike was treated for the injuries he sustained that day by Marty
Shields, M.D., at Ellis Unit before being later transported to UTMB
Galveston on or about July 1, 2018. In Galveston, Texas, Pike was
diagnosed, to the best of his memory, with orbital floor fracture and
ocular muscle entrapment, which has caused Mr. Pike permanent
double vision and embarrassing eyeball displacement.
TDCJ had prior knowledge of the dangerous condition of the
subject tractor’s unsecured and/or faulty top step that caused Mr.
Pike’s injuries[.] The faulty step was a condition of tangible
property that waive[d] immunity under the Act.
To this day, Mr. Pike continues to suffer from severe pain,
embarrassment, and permanent damage to the left orbital region of
his face.144
The Texas Attorney General appealed alleging that “the trial court erred
in denying TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction” when TDCJ never “used” the
tractor as required to waive sovereign immunity under Sections
101.021(1)(A) and (2) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.145
The 10th Court of Appeals in Waco reversed and sent the case back to the
trial court on that basis.146 The case is still pending and awaiting trial.147

144. Plaintiff James Pike’s First Amended Original Petition, and Request for Disclosure, supra
note 143, at 8, 10-17.
145. Pike, 2020 WL 6326469, at *2-4.
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id.
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F. Pratt148
Wayne Pratt (“Pratt”) was involved in a minor traffic accident.
In response to a disturbance call, HCSD Deputy Vincent Lopez,
upon arrival at the scene, observed a vehicle with front-end damage
resting in a ditch and Pratt “running in circles . . . imitating a
boxer.” HCSD Deputies Brian Goldstein and Michael Medina
arrived shortly. All three officers attempted to interact with Pratt.
Pratt did not respond, but began to walk away. All three officers
requested that he stop walking away. Pratt still did not respond, and
remained in an uncooperative state.
After several warnings, Pratt began approaching Lopez and
came within 5-7 feet of Lopez. Lopez then unholstered his taser
and commanded Pratt to stop. At this point, Goldstein and Medina
unholstered their tasers as well and Pratt began to run away. Lopez
deployed his taser, but was ineffective in stopping Pratt. Lopez
cycled his taser two more times in the next forty seconds, which
also failed to stop Pratt. Around this time, deputies Tommy Wilks,
Tarzis Lobos, Francisco Salazar, B. J. Auzene, R. DeAlejandro, and
R. M. Goerlitz arrived at the scene.
Because Lopez’s efforts to subdue Pratt were ineffective,
Medina deployed his taser. Pratt fell to the ground. Goldstein
attempted to handcuff Pratt but, because of Pratt’s continued
resistance, he was able to secure only one of Pratt’s arms in a
handcuff. Medina cycled his taser two more times in the next thirty
seconds. Pratt continued to struggle. When Lobos began aiding
Goldstein in handcuffing Pratt, however, he stopped resisting and
said “okay, okay, I’ll quit. . . . I’ll stop fighting.” Goldstein then
secured both of Pratt’s arms in handcuffs. Pratt was patted down
for weapons. None were found.
After Pratt was in handcuffs, Salazar aided Goldstein in lifting
Pratt and walking him toward the patrol car. After a few steps,
however, Pratt again began to resist and broke free from Goldstein’s
grip. Salazar returned Pratt to the ground. While on the ground,
Pratt began kicking at Goldstein and Salazar. Pratt kicked
Goldstein in the groin twice during the exchange. Witnessing this
exchange, Wilks retrieved a hobble restraint (i.e., handcuffs that
attach to an arrestee’s ankles) from his patrol car.
As Pratt continued to struggle, Salazar, Lobos, and Medina
attempted to aid Goldstein in controlling him. During this struggle
148. Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2016).
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Medina tasered Pratt once again, this time in “drive stun mode” (in
which the taser leads make direct contact with the arrestee’s body),
and Goldstein was able to gain control of Pratt’s legs. Goldstein
then rolled Pratt onto his stomach, crossed Pratt’s legs, and bent
them towards his buttocks. Salazar also placed his knee on Pratt’s
back in order to maintain compliance. When Wilks returned with
the hobble restraint, Goldstein aided him in attaching it to Pratt’s
legs. Pratt ceased resisting and said “Ok I quit. I’m done.”
Goldstein and Salazar also ceased physically restraining him. At
this point, Pratt’s handcuffs were connected to the hobble restraint
behind his back. Pratt was “hog-tied.”
EMS arrived at the scene. EMS paramedics requested that the
hobble restraint and handcuffs be removed so CPR could be
administered. Pratt did not have a pulse and had ceased breathing.
Upon treatment, Pratt regained a pulse, but did not resume
independent breathing until after arriving at the hospital. Pratt died
the following morning.149
Pratt died, among other factors, from positional asphyxiation as a result
of the hog-tying his ankles to his wrists and prone restraint.150
At the time of Pratt’s arrest, the HCSD had a policy that
prohibited officers from using hog-tie restraints, prompting the
HCSD to conduct an “In Custody Death Review” of Pratt’s death.
The results were presented to a grand jury, and Goldstein, Medina,
and Lopez were no-billed by the grand jury. A second internal
investigation was conducted, reviewing specifically the use of the
“hog-tying” restraint by Goldstein and Wilks. The Administrative
Disciplinary committee found Goldstein and Wilks’s alleged
misconduct “not sustained.”151
. . . Erony Pratt . . . brought this § 1983 cause of action alleging
various violations of Pratt’s Fourth Amendment rights against
individual officers and Harris County. The HCSD officers moved
for summary judgment, asserting defenses of qualified immunity.
Harris County also moved for summary judgment contending that
Pratt failed to sufficiently plead Monell liability as a matter of law.
On summary judgment, the district court granted qualified

149. Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 179.
151. Id.
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immunity to the HCSD officers, denied Pratt’s Monell claims
against Harris County, and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, Pratt challenge[d] the district court’s grant of
qualified immunity, contending unconstitutional conduct by HCSD
officers.152
“The district court granted qualified immunity to HCSD officers in their
individual
capacity
and
denied Pratt’s claims
under
Monell.
Pratt appealed.”153 The Court of Appeals affirmed.154
G. Sanders155
This case arises out of the death of Natalie Sanders who died in
custody at the Mesquite jail on May 26, 2017. On May 26, 2017,
Natalie Sanders was a thirty-seven year old woman—daughter of
Patricia Brannan and mother of Alyssa Sanders. Natalie was a
carefree and happy child until she hit her teen years. Her military
family moved every three years and that took its toll during
Natalie’s high school years. She eventually turned to drugs and
would swing between trouble and working diligently to be drug free
and get her life together.
On May 26, 2017, Ms. Sanders was waiting in a broken-down
truck for her boyfriend to return. A resident of the area, suspicious
of the truck, called the Mesquite police. The officers responding to
the call were Jeremie Wood and Defendant Layton Winters, who
arrived at the scene at approximately 8:45 a.m. . . .
After Ms. Sanders was in handcuffs, Officer Winters asked her
a series of questions about whether she had any drugs on her
person. He asked her if she had anything in her pockets such as
meth or heroin. When Ms. Sanders paused, Officer Winters stated
that was a “yes.” . . . Ms. Sanders stated that she had a “pipe.”
When Officer Winters asked her where she had the pipe, Ms.
Sanders reached around with her still cuffed right arm into her bra
and pulled out a meth pipe and handed it to Officer Winters.
Officer Winters again asked Ms. Sanders whether she had any
drugs on her. He asked about heroin and Ms. Sanders replied that
she didn’t do heroin. Winters responded with “what do you do?”
152. Id. at 179-80; citing Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., No. H–12–1770, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4757, 2015 WL 224945 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2015).
153. Pratt, 822 F.3d at 177. See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
154. Id.
155. Brannan v. City of Mesquite, Tex., No. 3:19-CV-1263-X, 2020 WL 7344125, slip op. (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 14, 2020).
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Ms. Sanders responded “meth.” Winters verified “meth?” Ms.
Sanders affirmed. Despite her on the spot confession that she “did”
meth and her possession of a meth pipe, neither officer conducted a
search of Ms. Sanders’ person. Instead, Officer Winters placed Ms.
Sanders in the back of his patrol car.
Shortly after being placed in the back of the patrol car, Ms.
Sanders (unbelted) reached into her jacket pocket, pulled something
out and placed it in the waistband of her pants. She then leaned
back against the seat and the officers (who had been searching her
belongings) seatbelted her in. Minutes before they arrived at the
Mesquite police station, Ms. Sanders asked Officer Winters if she
could have a drink of water when they arrived, and he told her yes.
She then leaned very far forward, removed the object from her
waistband and placed it in her mouth.
Minutes later, Officer Winters with Ms. Sanders arrived at the
Mesquite police department sally port. After exiting the car, they
began to walk to the jail entrance. Ms. Sanders stopped at a trash
can along the way and began to spit into the trash can and make dry
heaving movements. Officer Winters believed that Ms. Sanders had
swallowed, or was attempting to swallow, drugs. He ordered her to
spit them out, but she continued her swallowing attempts. Believing
that she had swallowed narcotics, Winters repeatedly yelled, “spit
out the dope!” Officer Winters apparently notified dispatch and
reported that Ms. Sanders had swallowed a narcotic. Even the
arrest report states that “[o]nce at the doors, Winters observed
Sanders attempting to swallow an unknown item believed to be
narcotics.” [emphasis omitted].
Officer Winters radioed to Officer Martin that he believed that
Ms. Sanders had swallowed a baggie of narcotics and he needed
assistance in the sally port. Officer Martin notified Officer Green
that it was believed that Ms. Sanders had swallowed a baggie of
narcotics and directed Officer Green to assist Officer Winters in the
sally port.
Officer Green went to the sally port to assist Defendant
Winters. Officer Green commanded Ms. Sanders to open her
mouth and tried to physically pry her mouth open repeatedly saying
“open your mouth![“] Green was aware that a detainee’s refusal to
open their mouth upon command was a red flag for ingestion of
something illegal.
Investigator Moehring, who investigated the in-custody death of
Ms. Sanders, reviewed the sally port video and noted that after
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visibly swallowing something, Ms. Sanders “immediately begins to
act as if she were under the influence of a substance.”
Officer Winters advised the jail supervisor, Defendant Lt.
Kelly, that Ms. Sanders had likely swallowed drugs in the sally
port.
The Mesquite Police Department Intake Screening Form for
Ms. Sanders was filled out by Lt. Kelly at 9:45 a.m. The form asks
“do you have any of the following conditions?” with a number of
conditions that can be check marked. For Ms. Sanders, Lt. Kelly
check marked “drug addiction” and next to that, hand-wrote
“meth.”
Up to the point where she swallowed what we now know was a
bag of meth, Ms. Sanders had been ambulatory, cooperative and
articulate. . . .
After Ms. Sanders swallowed the baggie of meth in the sally
port, her demeanor began to change. She was placed into a holding
cell where she was interviewed by Defendant Kelly using a preprinted form that asked questions about a detainee’s medical
history. Ms. Sanders laid on her side in the cell but responded to
most of the questions and told Kelly that she was addicted to
“meth.” . . .
Sanders was then taken to the medical cell to be assessed by
paramedics who had been contacted by the jail. She was
thoroughly searched and then placed on a concrete bench, where
she immediately slumped onto her side. . . .
The Mesquite Fire Department was contacted to dispatch
paramedics to assess Ms. Sanders. . . . When the paramedics entered
her cell, Ms. Sanders was curled into a ball on the bench, her arms
covering her face. Mr. Palaciano asked her if she had swallowed
anything. Ms. Sanders was unresponsive. . . . She had no verbal
response and instead, slumped back over on the bench and curled
into a fetal position.156 . . .
[The paramedics] told the officers that they were not going to
do anything for Ms. Sanders.157 . . .
Despite knowing the level of Ms. Sanders’ distress, Martin did
nothing to assist her and she died in her cell. . . .

156. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint at 15-17, 20-31, 33-34, 36, Brannan, 2020 WL
7344125, slip op. (No. 3:19-CV-1263-X).
157. Id. at 37.
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Ms. Sanders . . . was found non-responsive with no pulse or
breath. The paramedics were once again called, but it was too late.
Ms. Sanders died from an overdose of methamphetamine. . . .
The Mesquite Police Department has a history and pattern of
deliberate indifference to medical needs that has resulted in serious
injury and death to its citizens. Its unconstitutional policies,
customs and practices include, but are not limited to not to take
detainees to the hospital even if they are in a medical crisis; not to
respond to medical necessity; not to properly monitor
detainees/inmates; not to have a process for decision-making as
related to medical care for detainees between paramedics and
officers; to ignore detainee medical crises; and to dismiss substance
abuse induced medical problems as not meriting medical care.158
The District Court dismissed the case against the City, paramedics, and
all officers involved, save Winters and Kelly, on qualified immunity on
12(b)(6) motion.159 The remaining case is pending trial.160
H. Schrader161
Schrader was driving his huge and heavy welding truck to his
girlfriend’s house.162 En route, he saw police lights behind him, and not
realizing that he was the one the officers were trying to pull over, he looked
for a safe place to get out of the way so that they could pass. The officer
alleged that Schrader had been racing (in a welding truck) and was evading
arrest.163 He arrested Schrader on felony charges.164 Schrader was
restrained in handcuffs despite the fact that he had not been racing in a
welding truck nor evading rest and had committed no crime and was
complying with instructions.165 The officer then proceeded to do a “leg
sweep” on Schrader.166 But because he was illegally handcuffed, Schrader
was unable to break his fall, which resulted in a severely broken leg.167 All
this was caught on dashcam recordings. Schrader sustained several broken

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 47-48, 50.
Brannan, 2020 WL 7344125 at *1, *9.
Id. at *1.
Schrader v. Ruggles, No. 20-11257, 2021 WL 2843848 (5th Cir. Jul. 7, 2021).
Brief for Appellant at 6, Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848) (No. 20-11257).
Id.; Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *1.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 162, at 19
Id. at 6; Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *1.
Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *1.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 162, at 6; Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *1.
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bones, including a spiral fracture of the left tibia and the widely displaced
fracture in the left fibula.168
The district court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment
from which an appeal was taken to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the
grounds that “[t]he District Court erred in granting summary judgment for
Ms. Ruggles on the inattention to medical needs claims when there
remained qualified immunity issues of fact related to deliberate indifference
and knowledge of substantial harm.”169
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
stating that “Schrader fail[ed] to establish a sufficiently serious
deprivation.”170
I.

Timpa171

National headlines read, “MAN IN MENTAL CRISIS ALREADY IN
HANDCUFFS”172
On August 10, 2016, Anthony “Tony” Timpa was at New Fine
Arts located . . . [in] Dallas, TX. . . . While at that location, he
contacted 9-1-1 telling the dispatcher that he feared for his safety.
He further told the dispatcher that he suffered from anxiety,
schizophrenia, had been off of his medication, and was unarmed.
The call gets disrupted for some reason, and the dispatcher calls
him back. Throughout both calls, Timpa states he is anxious, and
afraid. At times, his statements are incoherent, and it is more than
apparent that he is disoriented. While outside of the store, Tony
suddenly and inexplicably to onlookers runs into the parking lot, as
depicted on a surveillance camera. Upon leaving the store, Tony
was pursued by Sammie Washington, who was working in the
course and scope of his employment for Terron Security Services,
Inc., a [s]ecurity [c]ompany employed by, or contracted by, New
Fine Arts.
Timpa crosses near the 1700 block of Mockingbird Lane
multiple times in a disoriented panic. Concerned for his own safety,
he flags down a security guard. Tony’s behavior remains erratic, as
other 9-1-1 callers indicate. . . . [T]he two security guards handcuff
him on the ground. Officers from the Dallas Police Department
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 162, at 22.
Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *1; Brief for Appellant, supra note 162, at 1.
Schrader, 2021 WL 2843848, at *3.
Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020 (5th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at 14, Timpa, 20 F.4th 1020 (No. 20-10876).
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begin arriving on the scene. First on the scene is Sgt. Kevin Mansell
who arrives near 10:30:36 PM. Some seven minutes later at
10:37:46 PM, Officers Justin Dillard, and Danny Vasquez arrive.
Next come Officers Domingo Rivera and Raymond Dominguez,
three minutes later at 10:40:13 and 10:40:41, respectively.173
THE DEFENDANTS SMOTHER TONY FOR 14 MINUTES
Officers Dillard and Vasquez approach Timpa, who is
handcuffed, and laying on the ground. Their body cameras record
Timpa telling the officers that, “You’re going to kill me.” (Vasquez
0:50-0:60). Dillard tells them that he is not going to do so, but then
he and other officers proceed to roll Timpa onto his chest face down
in the grass. Once face down, Vasquez puts his knee on Timpa’s
left shoulder, and pins it to the ground for approximately 160
seconds. (Dillard 0:50-3:30). Dillard puts his knee into the back of
Anthony Timpa, and pins him with his bodyweight. Dillard
likewise puts [his] hands on Timpa’s shoulders, and presses them
into the ground. As Vasquez and his own bodycam depicts, Dillard
maintains this position for approximately 14 minutes and 7 seconds.
(Vasquez 1:30-15:37). Periodically, Dillard applied additional
force into Timpa’s back. (Vasquez 2:03, 4:28, 8:40). While Dillard
and Vasquez pin down Timpa’s torso, Defendant Johnson puts his
bodyweight on Timpa’s thighs, and pulls and holds Timpa’s feet
and ankles forward at an angle. (Vasquez 1:31-3:47). . . . The body
cameras vividly depict the horror that unfolds during these minutes.
Anthony Timpa repeatedly tells the officers that they are going to
“kill me,” and “don’t hurt me.” (e.g., Vasquez 2:30-2:35).
Likewise, he makes repeated cries for help. (Vasquez 3:10, 3:403:45).174
“HIS NOSE IS BURIED.”
In multiple places, the audio, and video makes plain that the
Defendants recklessly, and knowingly were killing Tony Timpa.
Dillard does more than crush Tony’s lungs with his body weight.
He drives his neck, head, and face into the grass and dirt.175
OFFICERS RIDICULE A DYING MAN RATHER THAN
RENDER AID
Tony continues to gasp, gag, and groan. (Vasquez 9:15-9:35).
Meanwhile, the officers surrounding him laugh, and jeer. . . . After
approximately 11 and half minutes with Dillard’s knee square in his
173. Id. at 15-22.
174. Id. at 25-29, 32-33.
175. Id. at 37-38.
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back, Timpa goes completely unresponsive. (Vasquez 11:50). He is
no longer gasping, or mumbling. He is completely silent. It is not
until more than a minute later, [that] Dillard inquires if Tony is
conscious. He does not dislodge his knee, or move off of the
unresponsive Timpa.
Even after realizing that Tony is
unresponsive, Dillard continues to keep his bodyweight on top of
Tony for an additional two and a half minutes. (Vasquez 13:0215:37).176
OFFICERS FINALLY RECOGNIZE THEY HAVE KILLED
TONY
The officers then discuss with EMS workers what to do with
Tony. It is decided then that they will place him on a gurney, and
arrange transportation. . . . “I hope I didn’t kill him,” Dillard begins.
(Dillard 15:55). Some of the officers begin to laugh. (Dillard
16:00-16:05). . . . The officers load Tony into the ambulance.
Shortly thereafter, one of the EMS workers tells, Sgt. Kevin
Mansell, “He’s dead.” (Dillard 17:00).177
Because Mr. Timpa died in police custody, the Dallas Police
Department was required to complete a Custodial Death Report,
and submit it to the Texas Attorney General. . . . The Dallas Police
Department’s Custodial Death Report(“CDR”) states that Mr.
Timpa appeared intoxicated . . . [but] never threatened the officers
involved. The CDR states that Mr. Timpa never resisted being
handcuffed or arrested by the officers involved[,] . . . never
attempted to escape or flee from the officers involved[,] . . . never
attempted to hit or fight with the officers involved[,] . . . [and] never
used a weapon to threaten or assault the officers involved.178
MEDICAL EXAMINER CONCLUDES TONY’S DEATH
WAS A HOMICIDE
Dallas County Medical Examiner Dr. Emily Ogden shows that
Mr. Timpa’s death was the result of excessive physical restraint.
Dr. Ogden concluded the manner of Tony’s death was a
“Homicide.” . . . Dr. Emily Ogden likewise told Vicki Timpa that
an officer restrained by placing a knee on Mr. Timpa’s back for
some thirteen minutes while Mr. Timpa lay face-down restrained in
handcuffs.179

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 44, 46-47 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, supra note 172, at 49, 51-52, 54.
Id. at 59, 61-66 (citations omitted).
Id. at 68-69, 71.
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The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and
dismissed it based on qualified immunity.180 The United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the
trial court for trial.181 The Timpa case has gained national recognition, and
it has been featured on many news outlets.182
V.

OTHER CASES
A. Allah183
Petitioner, Almighty Supreme Born Allah, was deprived of his
constitutional rights when Respondents kept him in solitary
confinement for over a year as a pretrial detainee. It was clearly
established at the time of this deprivation that pretrial detainees may
not be subjected to punitive treatment, and that the dungeon-like
conditions in which Allah was kept were punitive because they
served no legitimate purpose in his case.184

“Allah was an inmate with the Connecticut Department of Correction
(“DOC”).”185 Allah was assigned to “Administrative Segregation” due to
receiving a high-risk score.186
Such segregation entails restrictive housing, close management, and
“physical separation from the general prison population.” . . . The
sole justification for his placement was that he had been in
Administrative Segregation when he was discharged earlier that
year, and it was DOC policy to continue segregating such detainees
on their return. . . . Therefore, his restrictions were purely punitive,
and violated his due process rights. But in a split decision, the court
held that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The
180. Timpa, 20 F.4th at 1025.
181. Id.
182. Bernie Pazanowski, Dallas Cop Must Face Suit Over Man Killed From Kneeling Tactic,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 16, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/dallas-copmust-face-suit-over-man-killed-from-kneeling-tactic; Joanna C. Schwartz, He Died After a Cop Kneeled
on His Neck for 14 Minutes. Now, His Family Can Finally Sue, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.
com/story/opinion/2021/12/29/police-force-officers-killed-him-when-he-asked-help/9024452002/ (last
visited Jul. 7, 2022); Jacob Vaughn, Federal Appeals Court: Dallas Police in Tony Timpa Case Not
Shielded by Qualified Immunity, DALLAS OBSERVER (Dec. 17, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.dallas
observer.com/news/federal-appeals-court-dallas-police-in-tony-timpa-case-not-shielded-by-qualified-im
munity-13032294.
183. Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017).
184. Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *2-3, Allah, 876 F.3d 48
(No. 16-1443-pr) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id. at *4-5.
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majority acknowledged that “the extremity of the conditions
imposed upon Allah come perilously close to the Supreme Court’s
description of ‘loading a detainee with chains and shackles and
throwing him in a dungeon.’”
Nevertheless, the majority
determined that Allah’s rights were not clearly established, because
“Defendants were following an established DOC practice,” and
“[n]o prior decision of the Supreme Court or of this Court . . . has
assessed the constitutionality of that particular practice.”187
B. Baxter v. Bracey.188
In early 2014, two Nashville police officers, Brad Bracey and
Spencer Harris, were pursuing a homeless man named Alexander
Baxter in response to reports that Baxter had been trying to
burglarize unlocked houses. The officers, along with a police dog,
followed Baxter into a residential basement and found Baxter sitting
on the ground with his hands in the air. Even though Baxter had
clearly surrendered at this point, however, Harris—after waiting
about 5 to 10 seconds—released the dog to attack Baxter. The
police dog bit Baxter in his armpit (which was exposed, as his
hands were raised in surrender), and Baxter required emergency
medical treatment at a hospital.189
Without criminal prosecution, people who are injured or killed by
police, or the families of those victims, often resort to civil litigation to seek
justice.190 Yet there have been numerous cases in which a plaintiff was
seriously injured or killed as a result of police misconduct but could not
recover damages because of qualified immunity.191 For plaintiffs to prevail,
they must show that the specific nature of the civil rights violation was
“clearly established” in a prior court ruling.192 For example, in 2020, the
Supreme Court of the United States threw out Baxter v. Bracey, in which a
man sought damages after an officer ordered a police dog to attack him,
even though he had surrendered and was seated with his arms in the air.193
The plaintiff in Baxter was unable to point to a prior case with similar
facts.194
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at *4-6 (citing Allah, 876 F.3d at 51-52, 58-60; quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20).
Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018).
Schweikert, supra note 9, at 7.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 7, 11-12; see, e.g., Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 184 (5th Cir. 2016).
Schweikert, supra note 9, at 6-7.
Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020); Schweikert, supra note 9, at 7.
Schweikert, supra note 9, at 7.
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C. Taylor195
A state inmate brought § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
housed him in unconstitutional conditions and were deliberately indifferent
to his health and safety, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and
sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.196 The
petitioner in this case, Trent Taylor, was an inmate in the custody of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Lubbock, Texas.197 Taylor
alleged that, for six full days in September 2013, correctional officers
confined him in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells.198 The first cell was
covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in “massive amounts of feces”: all over
the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even “packed inside the
water faucet.”199 Fearing that his food and water would be contaminated,
Taylor did not eat or drink for nearly four days.200 Correctional officers
then moved Taylor to a second, frigidly cold cell, which was equipped
with only a clogged drain in the floor to dispose of bodily wastes.201
Taylor held his bladder for over 24 hours, but he eventually (and
involuntarily) relieved himself, causing the drain to overflow and raw
sewage to spill across the floor.202 Because the cell lacked a bunk, and
because Taylor was confined without clothing, he was left to sleep naked
in sewage.203
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit properly held that such
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.204 However, based on its assessment that
“[t]he law wasn’t clearly established” that “prisoners couldn’t be housed in
cells teeming with human waste. . . for only six days,” the court concluded
that the prison officials responsible for Taylor’s confinement did not have
“‘fair warning’ that their specific acts were unconstitutional.”205
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit erred in granting the officers qualified immunity on this

195. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).
196. Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 2019).
197. Id. at 216.
198. Id. at 216, 218 n.6.
199. Id. at 218.
200. See id. at 218 (one officer, upon placing Taylor in the first feces-covered cell, remarked to
another that Taylor was “going to have a long weekend”); see also id. at 219 n.9 (another officer, upon
placing Taylor in the second cell, told Taylor he hoped Taylor would “f***ing freeze”).
201. Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218.
202. Id. at 219.
203. Id.at 218, 221-22.
204. Id. at 220.
205. Id. at 222 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
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basis.206 The Supreme Court has previously explained that “[q]ualified
immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even
if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing
the circumstances she confronted.”207 But no reasonable correctional
officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this
case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably
unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.208 The Fifth
Circuit identified no evidence that the conditions of Taylor’s confinement
were compelled by necessity or exigency.209 Nor does the summary
judgment record reveal any reason to suspect that the conditions of Taylor’s
confinement could not have been mitigated, either in degree or duration.210
And although an officer-by-officer analysis will be necessary on remand,
the record suggests that at least some officers involved in Taylor’s ordeal
were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his cells.211 Confronted
with the particularly egregious facts of this case, any reasonable officer
should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of confinement offended the
Constitution.212 The Supreme Court granted “Taylor’s petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacate[d] the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and remand[ed] the case for further proceedings consistent with . . .
[its] opinion.”213
The Harvard Law Review analysis214 of the Taylor case reveals that,
[f]ollowing the high-profile police killings of spring 2020, more
eyes have turned to holding officers accountable and the ways in
which legal doctrines like qualified immunity prevent that from
206. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).
207. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001)).
208. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (explaining that “a general constitutional rule already identified in
the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.”) (quoting United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)); see also id. at 745 (holding that “[t]he obvious cruelty
inherent” in putting inmates in certain wantonly “degrading and dangerous” situations provides officers
“with some notice that their alleged conduct violate[s]” the Eighth Amendment).
209. See generally Taylor, 946 F.3d 211.
210. See generally id.
211. Id. at 218-20.
212. See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 n.2 (2020) (“In holding otherwise, the Fifth Circuit
noted ‘ambiguity in the caselaw’ regarding whether ‘a time period so short [as six days] violated the
Constitution.’ But the case that troubled the Fifth Circuit is too dissimilar, in terms of both conditions
and duration of confinement, to create any doubt about the obviousness of Taylor’s right.”) (quoting
Taylor, 946 F.3d at 222); see Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1998) (the court found “no
Eighth Amendment violation where inmate was detained for three days in dirty cell and provided
cleaning supplies”).
213. Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 54.
214. Qualified Immunity – Obviousness Standard – Taylor v. Riojas, 135 HARV. L. REV. 421-22
(2021) (citations omitted).
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happening.
Qualified immunity has come under fire from
academics, judges, practitioners, legislators, and the public alike for
unjustly precluding remedies for violations of people’s
constitutional rights. Last term, in Taylor v. Riojas, the Supreme
Court held that correctional officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity because the conditions of confinement alleged by the
petitioner were so horrific that any reasonable officer should have
known they were unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court—for the
first time – overturned a grant of qualified immunity based on the
obviousness of the constitutional violation.215
D. Latits v. Philips216
In June 2010, Laszlo Latits was stopped by Detroit‐area police
for turning his car the wrong way on a divided boulevard. A police
officer testified that he saw bags in the car that he suspected
contained drugs, and the dashboard camera shows the officer
shining his flashlight into the car and raising his gun to Latits’s
head. Latits then drove away, and the police pursued. Another
officer, Lowell Phillips, repeatedly rammed Latits’ car—in
violation of department policy and a direct order not to use this
maneuver—and eventually drove Latits off the road. Phillips then
jumped out of his car, ran toward Latits’s, and shot him three times
in the chest, killing him. Latits’s widow sued Phillips under Section
1983, and the Sixth Circuit held that Phillips had violated Latits’s
Fourth Amendment rights because no reasonable officer would
have concluded that Latits “present[ed] an imminent or ongoing
danger . . . [therefore,] Officer Phillips’s use of deadly force was
objectively unreasonable.”217
E. Jessop v. City of Fresno218
[In Jessop,] [p]olice officers executing a search warrant in
relation to alleged illegal gambling machines produced an inventory
sheet stating that they had seized $50,000 from the suspects. But
the officers had actually seized $151,380 in cash and another
$125,000 in rare coins and simply pocketed the difference between

215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. (citations omitted).
Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017).
Schweikert, supra note 9, at 7.
Jessop v. City of Fresno, 918 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2019).
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what they seized and what they reported—effectively using a search
warrant to steal more than $225,000.
The Ninth Circuit granted immunity to the officers. The court
noted that while “the theft” of “personal property by police officers
sworn to uphold the law” may be “morally wrong,” the officers
could not be sued for the theft because the Ninth Circuit had never
issued a decision specifically involving the question of “whether the
theft of property covered by the terms of a search warrant, and
seized pursuant to that warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment.”219
F. Corbitt v. Vickers220
[In Corbitt v. Vickers,] [p]olice officers pursued a criminal
suspect, Christopher Barnett, into the backyard of Amy Corbitt
(who had no relation to Barnett), at which time one adult and six
minor children were in the yard. The officers demanded they all get
on the ground; everyone immediately complied, and the police took
Barnett into custody. But then the Corbitt family’s dog Bruce
walked into the scene. Without provocation or any immediate
threat, Michael Vickers, a deputy sheriff, fired his weapon at Bruce.
His first shot missed, and Bruce retreated under the home. About
10 seconds later, Bruce reappeared, and Vickers fired again—
missing once more, but this time striking Corbitt’s 10‐year‐old
child, who was still lying on the ground, only 18 inches away from
the officer. The child suffered severe pain and mental trauma and is
receiving ongoing care from an orthopedic surgeon.
The Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity to Vickers on
the grounds that no prior case law involved the “unique facts of this
case.” Although the panel majority dutifully recited United States
Supreme Court precedent purporting to say that overcoming
qualified immunity does not require that “the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful,” the court went on to
say that “[n]o case capable of clearly establishing the law for this
case holds that a temporarily seized person—as was [the child] in
this case—suffers a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when
an officer shoots at a dog—or any other object—and accidentally
hits the person.” One judge did dissent, and would have denied
qualified immunity on the seemingly obvious grounds that “no
219. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 11.
220. Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).
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competent officer would fire his weapon in the direction of a
nonthreatening pet while that pet was surrounded by children,” but
that position did not prevail.221
G. Kelsay v. Ernst222
Melanie Kelsay was swimming at a public pool with a friend,
engaged in what she called “horseplay,” but some onlookers
thought her friend might be assaulting her and called the police.
The police arrested her friend and put him in a patrol vehicle, even
though she repeatedly told them he hadn’t assaulted her; they then
decided to arrest her, the alleged victim of this non‐crime, because
she was “getting in the way of the patrol vehicle door.” While
talking with Deputy Matt Ernst, Kelsay saw that her daughter had
gotten into an argument with a bystander and tried to go check on
her. Ernst grabbed her arm and told her to “get back here,” but
released her. Kelsay then said she needed to go check on her
daughter and again began walking toward her. At that point,
without giving any further instructions, Ernst ran up behind her,
grabbed her, and slammed her to the ground in a “blind body slam”
maneuver, knocking her unconscious and breaking her collarbone.
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit granted qualified
immunity to Ernst. The Eighth Circuit then agreed to rehear the
case en banc and affirmed the panel’s grant of immunity in an 8–4
decision. The majority noted that there were no prior cases
involving the “particular circumstances” of this case; that is, no
prior cases specifically held that “a deputy was forbidden to use
a takedown maneuver to arrest a suspect who ignored the deputy’s
instruction to ‘get back here’ and continued to walk away from the
officer.” The principal dissent by Chief Judge Lavenski Smith
noted that that the Supreme Court has never required “a case
directly at point,” and that here, an ample body of case law would
have “put a reasonable officer on notice that the use of force against
a non-threatening misdemeanant who was not fleeing, resisting
arrest, or ignoring other commands violates that individual’s right

221. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 11. See also Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1323 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court decided not to review this case. Corbitt v. Vickers, 141 S. Ct.
110 (2020) (petition for writ of certiorari denied).
222. Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2019).
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to be free from excessive force.” But again, this position did not
prevail.223
VI.
LAW?)

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT (WHAT IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED

224

The Courts Of Appeals are divided in their application of the “clearly
established law” standard. As the amicus curiae brief submitted to the
Supreme Court in the Taylor case states, “the amorphous nature of the
‘clearly established law’ test has precluded the doctrine from effecting the
stability and predictability that normally justify respect for precedent.”225
Moreover, the courts have already treated qualified immunity as a judgemade, common law doctrine and thus appropriate for revision.226 Continued
adherence to the doctrine would not serve valid reliance interests but would
only prolong the inability of citizens to vindicate their constitutional
rights.227 In short, its utility has expired. Jay Schweikert calls qualified
immunity “one of the most obviously unjustified legal doctrines in our
nation’s history.”228 He justifies those claims because the doctrine is not
supported by constitutional, statutory, or common law.229 The point of my
paper is to establish that, at least from my experience, victims of egregious
misconduct have no legal remedy unless there happens to be a decided case
that directly involves the exact same sort of misconduct the victims
suffered. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand the absurdity of
such a requirement. For example: let’s say that no other officer has ever
stood over an unarmed teenager who is inside his own home and fired five
shots into the teen’s back, thus killing him dead in front of his mother, then
this doctrine would excuse his conduct? This “free pass” instead of
accountability undermines the very purpose of the Civil Rights Act.230 How
does such a doctrine allow the public to have the degree of public trust and
credibility in law enforcement that is required to keep civilization from
turning into anarchy?
According to Schweikert, “[t]he crucial takeaway from decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence is that ‘clearly established law’ cannot be
223. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 11-12.
224. Let me acknowledge that we have won many cases. These cases, however, do not add to our
examination of the overall impact of qualified immunity.
225. Brief of Cross-ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official Accountability, Resorting
the Pulic’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (No. 19-1261).
226. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233–34 (2009).
227. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 2.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1-2.
230. Id. at 2-3.
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defined at a high level of generality; instead, the law must be
‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”231 I agree with Schweikert that the
most straightforward and sensible solution is to completely abolish the
qualified immunity doctrine.232 Whatever happened to the adage “no one is
above the law”? As it happens, I am loathing, and sad to say is that many
are above the law.
In recognition of the reality of this proposition, New Mexico in 2021
took the bold step of enacting a state Civil Rights Act, which eliminated the
defense of qualified immunity.233 Colorado is taking a similar step,
although their language is a bit different than the New Mexico version.234
Some states are following New Mexico, while other states are doubling
down on the dogmatic support of qualified immunity.235 Make no mistake
though; qualified immunity is a very hotly debated topic.236
B. Call To Action
There has long been a discussion of ending or significantly amending
the qualified immunity doctrine.237 Congress has introduced legislation to
end qualified immunity, and Supreme Court justices of vastly different
judicial philosophies have also endorsed revisiting police officers’ liability
shield.238 For now, however, it remains the doctrine of the courts that
plaintiffs bringing a Section1983 claim must first show that the public
official’s unconstitutional actions were very similar to a previous case in
which qualified immunity was denied.239 While the Supreme Court recently
declined to grant a handful of petitions calling for qualified immunity to be

231. Id. at 7 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)).
232. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 2.
233. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4A-4 (2022).
234. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(2)(b) (2022).
235. Jay Schweikert, Qualified Immunity, A.B.A. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-21/issue1/qualified-immunity/ [hereinafter Qualified Immunity, A.B.A.]; Kimberly Kindy, Dozens of States Have
Ttried to End Qualified Immunity. Police Officers and Unions Helped Beat Nearly Every Bill, WASH.
POST (Oct. 7, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/qualified-immunity-policelobbying-state-legislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html.
236. Schweikert, Qualified Immunity, A.B.A., supra note 235.
237. Adam M. Taylor, & Ayanna Alexander, Calls to End Qualified Immunity Boosted by
Chauvin’s Conviction, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 21, 2021, 6:37 PM) https:// news.bloomberglaw.com
/business-and-practice/calls-to-end-qualified-immunity-boosted-by-chauvins-conviction.
238. Schweikert, Qualified Immunity, A.B.A., supra note 235.
239. Osagie K. Obasogie & Anna Zaret, Plainly Incompetent: How Qualified Immunity Became an
Exculpatory Doctrine of Police Excessive Force, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 407, 411 (2022).
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reconsidered,240 whether it should do so in a future case remains an open
and pressing question.241
VII.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Several arguments against qualified immunity as it currently
stands include:
• Liability is necessary to hold officers accountable for excessive
force . . . [and to thwart officers from] maliciously violat[ing]
the Fourth Amendment and other Constitutional rights of
citizens without any cost to themselves[.] . . .
• The fear of rampant lawsuits against police are overblown.
• The current doctrine as applied today in courts leads to
hairsplitting and it is often impossible for plaintiffs to meet the
burden.
• The doctrine is applied inconsistently and can greatly depend
on the judge or judges involved in the case.242

The sensical result of the existence of the qualified immunity doctrine is
that it both denies justice to victims and also ossifies any further
development of the law.243 Indeed, “if courts refuse to resolve legal claims
because the law was not clearly established” at the time of the case, then,
logically, the law never has the opportunity to “become clearly
established”.244 “[I]f courts grant qualified immunity without at least
deciding the merits question, then the same defendant could continue
committing exactly the same misconduct indefinitely—and never be held
accountable.”245
A. Pullback?
In the past several years the Supreme Court has attempted to justify
qualified immunity on traditional grounds, but many members of the Court

240. See generally Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (petition for writ of certiorari denied);
Corbitt, 141 S. Ct. 110 (petition for writ of certiorari denied); Zadeh v. Robinson, 141 S. Ct. 110
(petition for writ of certiorari denied).
241. See Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1865 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“I
continue to have strong doubts about our §1983 qualified immunity doctrine. Given the importance of
this question, I would grant the petition for certiorari.”).
242. Both Sides of the Debate, supra note 28.
243. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 8.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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have come to grips with the fact that the modern qualified immunity
doctrine lacks historical grounding:246
• In the 2020 case Taylor v. Riojas, discussed above, the Court in a per
curium opinion created the obviousness doctrine as an exception to
qualified immunity.247
• “In the 2018 case Kisela v. Hughes, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented,
noting that qualified immunity has become ‘an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers’ that has ‘gutt[ed] the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment.’”248
• “In the 2017 case Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in a
concurring opinion that ‘[i]n further elaborating the doctrine of
qualified immunity . . . we have diverged from the historical inquiry
mandated by the statute.’”249
• “In the 1998 case Crawford‐El v. Britton, Justice Antonin Scalia
dissented, saying, ‘our treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 has not purported to be faithful to the common‐law immunities
that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably
intended to subsume.’”250
• “And in the 1992 case Wyatt v. Cole, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion, acknowledging that ‘[i]n the context of qualified
immunity . . . we have diverged to a substantial degree from the
historical standards.’”251
“In short, qualified immunity has become nothing more than a
‘freewheeling policy choice’ that is at odds with Congress’s judgment in
enacting Section 1983.”252
B. Crisis of Accountability in Law Enforcement
In the context of law enforcement officers, qualified immunity has been
in the public view dating all the way back to the police beating Rodney
King.253 Because the public can now view the facts that allegedly give rise
to qualified immunity, decent and well-trained officers are hurt and
246. Id. at 6.
247. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020).
248. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
249. Id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
250. Id. (quoting Crawford‐El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
251. Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
252. Id. at 3; Cole, 504 U.S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 342 (1986)); Schweikert, supra note 9, at 3.
253. See generally LOU CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: HOW RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS
CHANGED LOS ANGELES AND THE LAPD (1997).
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disadvantaged by those officers who are improperly trained and act with ill
motives.254 Qualified immunity erodes the public trust in the police force
globally, not just bad police officers, by depriving officers of the public
trust and confidence that is necessary for them to do their job safely and
effectively.255 Although only a subsect of police officers are involved in
fatal encounters each year, that subsect is still responsible for an
astronomical amount of fatalities in “absolute terms.”256 Schweikert points
out that,
between 2015 and 2017, police officers fatally shot nearly a
thousand Americans each year, with tens of thousands more
wounded. And the widespread prevalence of cellphones, combined
with the ability to share videos on YouTube and other social media,
means that footage of police shootings are being documented and
shared like never before. It is therefore unsurprising that, as word
and video of police misconduct has spread, faith in law enforcement
has plummeted. Indeed, in 2015, Gallup reported that public trust
in police officers had reached a 22‐year low.257
Due to many recent events, including the unjustified murder of George
Floyd at the hands of police officers, the percentage of the general public
that trusts police officers continues to sink.258
C. Widespread Judicial Criticism
“Even though qualified immunity is a judicial invention, its legal,
practical, and moral infirmities have not gone unnoticed by members of the
judiciary.”259 In addition to current and former United States Supreme
Court justices who have criticized qualified immunity, a diverse spectrum of

254. Jay Schweikert et al., How Qualified Immunity Hurts Law Enforcement, CATO INST., https://
www.cato.org/study/how-qualified-immunity-hurts-law-enforcement (last visited July 7, 2022).
255. Id.
256. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 12 (citing Gene Demby, Some Key Facts We’ve Learned about
Police Shootings over the Past Year, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 13, 2015).
257. Id. at 12 (citing Julie Tate et al., supra note 115; Nathan DiCamillo, About 51,000 People
Injured Annually by Police, Study Shows, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2017) https://www.newsweek.com/
51000-people-injured-annually-police-586524; Wesley Lowery, On Policing, the National Mood Turns
Toward Reform, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2015); Jeffery M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in
22 Years, GALLUP (June 19, 2015) https://news.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowestyears.aspx.
258. See generally Desmond Ang et al., Police Violence Reduces Civilian Cooperation and
Engagement with Law Enforcement, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.hks.harvard.
edu/publications/police-violence-reduces-civilian-cooperation-and-engagement-law-enforcement.
259. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 13.
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lower court judges have criticized qualified immunity as well, with many
asking the Supreme Court to abolish qualified immunity altogether.260
Jay Sweikert mentions several lower judges that have criticized
qualified immunity in his article, quoted below:
Judge Don Willett, a Trump appointee to the Fifth Circuit,
explained how “[t]o some observers, qualified immunity smacks of
unqualified impunity, letting public officials duck consequences for
bad behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonable—as long as
they were the first to behave badly,” and he sharply noted that “this
entrenched, judge‐created doctrine excuses constitutional violations
by limiting the statute Congress passed to redress constitutional
violations.”261
Judge Willett of the Fifth Circuit explained in a recent opinion that this
creates a ‘Catch-22’ for civil rights plaintiffs.262 Because courts often take
what Willett called the “simpler” route of resolving a case based on the
“clearly established” inquiry—rather than engaging in the “knotty
constitutional inquiry” of whether the officials violated the Constitution—
Pearson has resulted in fewer precedents finding constitutional
violations.263 In turn, as Willett put it, “[n]o precedent = no clearly
established law = no liability.”264 And according to a recent study
conducted by Reuters: “Plaintiffs in excessive force cases against police
have had a harder time getting past qualified immunity since [Pearson].”265
Judge James Browning, a George W. Bush appointee to the
District of New Mexico, has issued several opinions that include
a blistering criticism of the Supreme Court’s “clearly established
law” standard, and cites the Cato Institute’s amicus briefs for the
argument that “qualified immunity has increasingly diverged from
the statutory and historical framework on which it is supposed to be
based.”266
Judge Lynn Adelman, a Clinton appointee to the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, wrote an article for Dissent magazine titled
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2019)).
262. Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479 (Willett, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 479-80.
265. Andrew Chung et al., Shielded, REUTERS INVESTIGATES, https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/ (last visited July 7, 2022).
266. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 13 (citing Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., 331 F.
Supp.3d 1260, 1294 n.10 (D.N.M. 2018)).
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“The Supreme Court’s Quiet Assault on Civil Rights,” in which he
argued that “[o]f all the restrictions that the Court has imposed on
[Section 1983] . . . the one that has rapidly become the most
harmful to the enforcement of constitutional rights is the doctrine of
qualified immunity.” Adelman also participated in a Cato Institute
forum on qualified immunity in March 2018, in which he elaborated
on the legal, doctrinal, and practical problems with qualified
immunity.267
As Professor Scott Michelman aptly put it, “in order for a plaintiff to
overcome qualified immunity, the right violated must be so clear that its
violation in the plaintiff’s case would have been obvious not just to the
average ‘reasonable officer’ but to the least informed, least reasonable
‘reasonable officer.’”268
D. What To Do About Qualified Immunity
The starting point for any discussion about how to address qualified
immunity should be the total elimination of the doctrine.269 Under the plain
terms of Section 1983, and in accordance with the common‐ law
background against which that statute was passed, any state actor who
violates someone’s constitutional rights is supposed to be “liable to the
party injured”—period.270 The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, which
was passed by the House of Representatives in March 2022, is faced with
significant opposition in the Senate because a portion of the Act seeks to
discard the doctrine of qualified immunity.271 “Critics say it shields police
officers from personal liability for their actions, while supporters call it
essential to officers’ ability to do their job. There are strong arguments for
and against qualified immunity, but its implications for police
accountability are complex and poorly understood.”272 As Schweikert
explains:

267. Id. (citing Lynn Adelman, supra note 109); Jay Schweikert, Qualified Immunity: The
Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police Accountability, CATO INST., (Mar. 1,
2018),
https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-immunity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rightspolice-accountability.
268. Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1999, 2004 (2018).
269. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 2.
270. Id.
271. Nancy La Vigne & Marc Levin, Five Myths About Qualified Immunity, WASH. POST (May
27, 2021, 2:33 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-qualifiedimmunity/2021/05/27/db829e38-bcbc-11eb-9c90-731aff7d9a0d_story.html.
272. Id.
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Outright abolition of qualified immunity would give concrete form
to the axiomatic legal principle that for every right, there is
a remedy. It would also maximally encourage public
accountability—especially among members of law enforcement—
by ensuring that all government agents take seriously their
independent obligations to understand and abide by constitutional
limitations. In other words, “the courts didn’t tell me not to do it!”
would not be a sufficient excuse for public officials who break the
law.273
In my opinion, making municipal employers liable for the illegal
conduct of their employees may itself be a promising strategy for increasing
accountability. Qualified immunity is a doctrine that has long outlived its
utility.

273. Schweikert, supra note 9, at 14.
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